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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an immanent critique of Catherine Malabou’s account of the 
origin of plasticity, arguing that Malabou’s account of plasticity—as a philosophical concept or 
form—does not meet the standard of her own conception of the epigenetic development of form. 
Using Malabou’s Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality, this paper argues that Malabou’s own 
account of plasticity hews closer to theories of formation Malabou explicitly abjures: spontaneous 
generation and preformationism. Accordingly, Malabou’s articulation of plasticity lacks an 
account of its conceptual epigenesis that would fulfill the epigenetic standards of her own 
thinking. First, we will characterize the origin and history of plasticity as described by Malabou 
as consisting of two primary claims: plasticity arrives in and with Hegel, and that it is through 
Hegel’s substantialization of plasticity that it becomes a concept. Plasticity first emerges in Hegel 
and that it becomes-substantive through Hegel, attaining the dignity of a proper philosophical 
concept. We then move to an exegesis of Malabou’s account of theories of generation in her 
analysis of Kantian epigenesis in Before Tomorrow, arguing that the extant account of plasticity 
provided by Malabou resembles paradigms of formation she rejects. Lastly, we sketch out some 
possible pathways to explore to furnish the epigenetic becoming-substantive of plasticity currently 
missing in Malabou's account. 
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In Before Tomorrow, Malabou argues that all form—whether biological or 
philosophical—emerges through epigenesis rather than the competing 
paradigms of spontaneous generation or preformationism. All form must become 
and, thus, cannot emerge miraculously (spontaneous generation) or simply unfold 
from a predetermined origin (preformationism); plasticity as a philosophical form 
must or should develop epigenetically. If plasticity is a substantive form and 
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substance, as Malabou insists, is born of or emerges processually through the 
incorporation of its accidents: what then of the becoming-substantive of plasticity; 
what of the history of its accidents? If substance is the history, the singular 
expression, of its accidents—the becoming essential or substantial of the 
accident—then what of the history of the epigenetic becoming-substantive of 
plasticity?  
* 
“Everything began,” Catherine Malabou writes, “when, ‘falling’ one day onto 
the term ‘plastic’, I was brought to a stop, at once intrigued and grateful…[i]t was 
an accident…that brought me to the essential.”1 Let us gather and explicate what 
Malabou, the plastiquese,2 specifically states about the history and origin of 
plasticity—the threefold capacity to give, receive, and destroy form—as a 
concept: how this accident became essential or substantial. In her self-described 
“conceptual portrait”3 and intellectual “autobiography”4 Plasticity at the Dusk of  
Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction (2005; tr. 2010), Malabou recounts and 
explicates the trajectory of her philosophical development, giving an account of 
her philosophical self and of how her central concept of ‘plasticity’ emerges in 
her thinking. The first key claim Malabou makes in her account of the history 
and origin of plasticity is that “…the concept of plasticity” was “discovered for 
the first time in the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit…discovered in the 
heart of Hegelian philosophy…”5 Hegel’s philosophy is, Malabou writes, 
 
1 Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic (trans.) Lisbeth During (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 185-6.  
2 Catherine Malabou, Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy (trans.) Carolyn Shread 
(Malden: Polity, 2011), 120, 137: “the bringing to light of plasticity can only be the work of a ‘plastiquese,’ that 
is, an explosive plastic artist. So I was well and truly granted the role of creator”; “…don’t tell me that I hide 
behind the ‘authority’ of Hegel or Heidegger too often. I’ve worked hard in my own way to make their lives 
impossible too…Plastiquese. That’s what Derrida called me. The plastic explosive artist…” 
3 Malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction (trans.) Carolyn Shread (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 2.  
4 Malabou, ibid. 65.  
5 Malabou, ibid. 8-9. Malabou also reiterates this, among elsewhere, in a 2010 interview when asked to 
clarify the development of the concept of plasticity: ““I found it for the first time in Hegel.” See Catherine 
Malabou and Noelle Vahanian, “A Conversation with Catherine Malabou,” Journal for Cultural and Religious 
Theory 9, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 1-13, here 6.  
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plasticity’s “place of birth.”6 It is through this accidental discovery of the term 
plasticity in Hegel that Malabou arrives at the essence of answering the 
provocation of her doctoral thesis and inaugural major work: against the broad 
anti-Hegelian consensus of the 20th century, represented first by Martin 
Heidegger, then in France, in various ways, through Gilles Deleuze, Michel 
Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, was there a way to offer “the existence of a true 
conception of the future in Hegel and, beyond that, a future for Hegelianism 
itself ”?7 Crystallizing numerous objections to Hegel and ventriloquizing critics, 
Malabou rhetorically muses, when we encounter and try to tarry with Hegel,  
…don’t we begin to feel constricted, as if ontology has closed in on us? The System: 
doesn’t it seem to be a tight loop which envelops everything – all exteriority, all 
alterity, all surprise?...Spirit, whose task is to comprehend itself, to anticipate itself 
in everything that is now and is to come, can never encounter anything wholly 
other, can never come face to face, one might say, with the event. How, then, could 
there be room in Hegelian thought for the question of the future, if everything has 
already been permeated by spirit and, in this fashion, already completed?8 
This, according to Malabou, captures in essence all fundamental objections 
to Hegel: that his thought lacks a future. In Hegel, Spirit determines everything, 
divesting life (ourselves, us, nature, the world) of all possible surprises, voraciously 
subsuming every difference into a system predicated on an expansionist, 
imperializing identity. In Hegel, in the last instance, there is nothing to be done, 
because everything is already completed—there is nothing that can happen: no 
happenstance, chance, or the swerve of an otherwise, only the adamantine 
realization or actualization of the Absolute as absolutely necessary. This “absence 
of a conception of the future in Hegel,” Malabou writes, is tantamount to 
asserting, “the absence of a future for the philosophy of Hegel.”9 Against this claim, 
Malabou proposes to demonstrate the contrary and “affirm that there is indeed 
a ‘future of Hegel’”10 and it is plasticity that promises this possibility.  
The second component in Malabou’s account is the becoming substantive of 
 
6 Malabou, Plasticity at Dusk, 1.  
7 Malabou, Changing Difference, 67.  
8 Malabou, Future of Hegel, 4.  
9 Malabou, Future of Hegel, 5.  
10 Ibid. 
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plasticity, a becoming substantive which has a twofold sense: one that refers to 
plasticity’s becoming substantive in and through Hegel, and, second, the implicit 
sense that plasticity becomes essential or substantive in Hegel through Malabou’s 
interpretive intervention. The first is that Hegel decisively modifies the register in 
which plasticity operates by displacing it from its originary domain and 
conferring upon it the status of a substantive. According to Malabou, Hegel 
novelly enlarges plasticity’s scope of application by amplifying and expanding it 
from a previous strict aesthetic meaning to encompass a more comprehensive 
philosophical, ontological or metaphysical purview. Hegel is the first philosopher 
to authorize, elevate, and substantialize plasticity, to “accord it the value of a 
concept.”11 In The Future of  Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic (1996; 2005), 
Malabou documents that the substantive ‘plasticity’ enters the English, French 
(plasticité), and German (Plastizität) languages in the eighteenth-century, 
developing closely from two existing related words that shared the same root of 
the Greek plassein, meaning to model or to mold: the substantive ‘plastics’ (die 
Plastik), and the adjective ‘plastic’ (plastisch).12 The words ‘plastics’ and ‘plastic’ 
were deployed, Malabou attests, in the “native land” or “original domain” of 
plasticity, “the field of the art,” with plastic arts characterizing “the art of 
‘modelling’, and, in the first instance, the art of sculpture” while generally 
referring to or being inclusive of those arts “whose central aim is the articulation 
and development of forms” such as “architecture, drawing and painting.”13 
According to Malabou, Hegel “rips [plasticity] away from” these traditional 
“strict aesthetic ties (or sculptural ties, to be precise), definitively conferring the 
metaphysical dignity of an essential characteristic of subjectivity upon it.”14 
Malabou re-affirms this position in a 2016 interview, “The Future of Plasticity,” 
recapitulating her claims in The Future of  Hegel that the term Plastizität appears at 
the end of the eighteenth century and that “in the beginning, it was specifically 
devoted to aesthetics” but that it is Hegel who “displaced it from the aesthetic 
realm into the metaphysical one in order to characterize subjectivity and time in 
 
11 Malabou, Changing Difference, 79.  
12 Malabou, Future of Hegel, 8.  
13 Malabou, Future of Hegel, 8.  
14 Malabou, Plasticity at Dusk, 13.  
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general.”15 This priority of becoming substantive is reiterated by Jacques Derrida, 
who as Malabou’s supervisor guided the composition and completion of 
Malabou’s text, stating in a footnote accompanying his preface to The Future of  
Hegel:  
If the substantive plasticity (Plastizität), implying that the term is always to be promoted to the 
dignity of  a philosophical notion or concept, has been written in the French language since 
before the Revolution (1785) and entered the German language in the ‘Age of 
Goethe’ (according to the Brockhaus dictionary), it is an adjectival form, 
plastisch…16 
Prior to Hegel, then, plastics, plastic, and plasticity were used exclusively with 
respect to aesthetics and it is through Hegel’s exportation of plasticity from its 
originary field of aesthetics to that of having a wider philosophical and 
metaphysical purchase that plasticity obtains a new substantive, and decisively 
philosophical, meaning.  
The second critical manner plasticity becomes substantive is the implicit sense 
concerning Malabou’s own role in this process: it is Malabou herself who 
catalyzes plasticity’s transformation from an accident in Hegel to the very essence 
or substance of his thought. As Malabou recounts in Changing Difference: The 
Feminine and the Question of  Philosophy, affirming the future of Hegel implicated and 
required a consideration of ‘recovery’ and its related “gestures” of what it means 
“to heal, to repair, to relocate a lost object or normal state, to reclaim, to 
recuperate” in the context of reading and interpreting philosophy.17 The long 
siege on Hegel, stretching from the Young Hegelians and Marx, to Kierkegaard, 
to Heidegger, Adorno, Sartre, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida, is figured in 
Malabou’s reading as tantamount to an attack: Hegel was effectively wounded 
and in need of mending or saving if he were to ‘survive’ or to have a future. To 
accomplish this, Malabou conceptualizes her treatment of Hegel as a way to heal 
Hegel through a recovery operation of bringing his thought back through a kind 
 
15 Catherine Malabou and Kate Lawless, “The Future of Plasticity,” interview by Kate Lawless in Chiasma: 
A Site for Thought 3, Article 7 (2016): 99-108, here 103-4 
16 Jacques Derrida, “A Time for Farewells: Heidegger (read by) Hegel (read by) Malabou,” The Future of 
Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, Dialectic (trans.) Lisbeth During (New York: Routledge, 2004), 195, fn. 11. 
Emphasis mine.  
17 Malabou, Changing Difference, 67.  
 THOMAS WORMALD 107 
of interpretive revivification. The challenge was to genuinely recuperate Hegel 
and not bring him back as merely a ghost18—to actually have Hegel be a viable, 
live option that could meet the demands of both the destruction and 
deconstruction of metaphysics (the challenges of Heidegger and Derrida). This 
rescue requires a particular recuperative procedure of philosophical reinvention, 
an interpretive gesture that, Malabou elaborates, consists not in the “creation of 
an entirely new concept or philosophical category, but rather in identifying a 
word or notion already present within a corpus, but to which no one has ever 
paid any attention.”19 One starts “with that which has been ignored within the 
text by readers and, to some extent, by author alike” and, through this process, 
produce “novelty by bringing back the ancient, revealing an unimagined force 
through the old text.”20 Such was, Malabou proposes, the concept of plasticity, 
which was “long ignored by Hegel’s critics” and “had never really been noticed 
by his commentators.”21 So, it is Malabou herself that by the fortune of an accident 
discovers plasticity and transforms Hegel anew: from unacknowledged margins 
in the history of Hegel’s thought, Malabou draws the resource of plasticity to re-
shape and re-form the essence or substance of Hegel in the present to give this 
thought a future.  
* 
The origin story of plasticity upon which Malabou’s philosophical project 
rests has become practically rote in both Malabou’s own account and secondary 
engagements with her work: Malabou’s decisive philosophical intervention and 
contribution is the theorization of the notion of plasticity and that Malabou finds 
this in and extrapolates this concept from Hegel. Strangely, the veracity of this 
origin story has never been challenged. It has never been asked if this is true but 
has seemingly been accepted by fiat, becoming a kind of doxa through a curious 
uncritical recapitulation, attaining the status of something like a natural fact: 
plasticity lay ready-made and dormant in Hegel, awaiting excavation and given 
life through Malabou’s surgical, plastic hands. To return to the 2016 interview, 
 
18 Ibid. 80.  
19 Malabou, Changing Difference, 68.  
20 Ibid.   
21 Ibid.   
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“The Future of Plasticity,” while Malabou largely recapitulates her standard 
account of the history and origin of plasticity, she interestingly adds something to 
the story of plasticity absent in previous accounts. Malabou states again that the 
term Plastizität emerges in the eighteenth century, but, here, this emergence does 
not float anonymously, but is ascribed to a figure: Goethe. Malabou concedes, 
“in some sense, [Hegel] stole the concept from Goethe. So Goethe invented the 
substantive, Plastizität to designate the capacity to be sculpted. And Hegel 
distorted that to make it characterize the temporal being of subjectivity.”22 Here, 
then, we have an added character to the story, a twist in the narrative to re-
consider—the suggestion of a past to or history of plasticity. The introduction of 
the figure of Goethe then adds an antecedent to what has been an otherwise 
miraculous birth: plasticity does not emerge fully formed in Hegel, but is, 
Malabou relays, stolen from Goethe. The admission of this prefigurative source 
however only invites another question in the manner of regress: if Hegel ‘stole’ 
this concept from Goethe, from where did Goethe himself take or develop this 
concept?  
* 
In Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality, Malabou proposes an “epigenetic 
reading of  Kantian epigenesis,”23 elaborating the development of the idea of epigenesis 
in Kant and the transferences between biological and philosophical theories of 
generation in Kant’s conceptualization of the transcendental from the Critique of  
Pure Reason to Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. As part of her exposition on the 
primacy of epigenesis as a paradigmatic model shaping Kant’s thought, Malabou 
outlines three predominant positions corresponding to three different modes of 
understanding how forms generate: equivocal or spontaneous generation, 
preformationism, and, lastly, the position Malabou ultimately advocates, 
epigenesis. The first, spontaneous generation, explains the emergence of living 
form from inert matter, postulating “an inorganic origin out of which the 
living…miraculously appears.”24 This occasionalist position maintains that “the 
 
22 Malabou and Lawless, “The Future of Plasticity”, 103-4.  
23 Catherine Malabou, Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality (trans.) Carolyn Shread (New York: Polity 
Press, 2016), 37.  
24 Malabou, Before Tomorrow, 22.  
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living is endowed with no formative force at all and is always, on every occasion, 
created or re-created by God.”25 The second, preformationism, maintains that 
form is effectively predetermined or preformed: the essence of a form is innate, 
preexisting its material actualization; all that form requires is to unfurl, unfold, or 
unwrap and become what it already is, like “an already constituted and amassed 
treasure that asks only to pour out before our eyes.”26 Lastly, there is epigenesis 
which asserts that form does not emerge by either the “magical animation”27 of 
spontaneous generation nor the “divine decree”28 of preformationism but actually 
becomes or develops through a process of self-differentiation. Epigenesis 
countenances that form is not preformed or determined from the beginning, once 
and for all, but gradually or processually adopts its particular shape through 
acquisition, adaptation, and adjustment: form earns its substantial appearance 
through the intra-actions and intrications of history, experience, time. Malabou 
ultimately inveighs against both spontaneous generation and preformationism, 
arguing that they both improperly account for the epigenetic nature of biological 
and philosophical forms, an identity upon which she insists. In terms of the 
development and interpretation of philosophical concepts, then, we can 
extrapolate that spontaneous generation as a paradigm would resemble 
something of an interpretive occasionalism whereby a supervening agent creates 
or generates something categorically different from its source material: the 
interpreter as deity, summoning a meaning and power that does not actually exist 
in the original. A preformationist approach would be that of the discoverer: the 
interpretive agent uncovers a concept, some kind of textual treasure, full and 
replete to itself, with their task being only to simply uncover and present it, 
hauling it from its textual encasement. An understanding of conceptual 
development based on epigenesis, conversely, would not posit a concept’s 
substantial meaning as intact from the outset, attributable to the creative act or 
hand of a singular author, but view this conceptual meaning as the product or 
result of a history: as an amassing and incorporating, differentiating and 
 
25 Ibid. 161.  
26 Ibid. 26.  
27 Ibid. 25.  
28 Ibid. 24, 31, 97.  
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complexifying, of texture through its philosophical ‘life.’  
If these are the paradigms of generation, and Malabou advocates epigenesis 
as the proper way of understanding the development of biological and 
philosophical forms, how are we to adjudicate the account of the origin of 
plasticity provided by Malabou? Given our initial description of Malabou’s 
account above, Malabou’s own explication of the origin and account of plasticity 
appears to actually hew closer to the two models of generation that she abjures. 
First, it appears that plasticity emerges out of nowhere: long dormant, it takes the 
intervention of Malabou to give it life. In this respect, plasticity resembles a 
product born of the “magical animation” of equivocal generation, characterized 
as “the existence of birth foreign to its source, offspring born of nothing[?]”29 Did 
Malabou orchestrate the occasionalist gesture of creating a philosophical entity 
that is not there in the original—plasticity as a “theoretical monstrosity” that is not 
Hegel or in Hegel, but is purely the arbitrary production of Malabou as 
interpretive God?30 Such a reading would invalidate Malabou’s elaboration of 
plasticity, as it would mean that Malabou’s philosophical operation would be 
tantamount to a miraculous invention that admits or implies that there was 
nothing in the source material of Hegel’s text that could meaningfully produce or 
inform the notion of plasticity; a dead text that Malabou externally vivifies, 
granting a power and vitality that is not originally there. This reading is redolent 
of those unsympathetic to Malabou’s treatment of Hegel: it is a creation, an act 
of undue license that exceeds the nature or essence of the original; summoning a 
life and a form that is not there but through an act of interpretive occasionalism. 
One can alternatively approach Malabou’s account of the development of 
plasticity through the model of preformationism: plasticity is definitively in Hegel 
and Hegel is the genetic origin of plasticity. In this mode, Malabou would simply 
act as explorer and discoverer, facilitating the excavation of a concept Hegel 
created, in all its philosophical depth and rigour, as if by ‘divine decree.’ The 
corpus of Hegel acts as a chest out of which the “already constituted and amassed 
 
29 Ibid. 22.  
30 This could have two senses: the one discussed here, but also the sense in which Hegel himself 
spontaneously generates this concept, imbuing the word with a substantial or essential meaning that was 
not there previously; animating plasticity, making it alive.  
 THOMAS WORMALD 111 
treasure” of plasticity “asks only to pour out before our eyes.”31 The essence or 
substantial meaning of plasticity is authored uniquely by and from Hegel. 
However, if this were the case, plasticity’s meaning is, then, delimited, already 
circumscribed, preformed, or predetermined by an innate matrix of possibilities 
inscribed at the outset by Hegel. The future of plasticity is preestablished, 
curtailed and contoured from the beginning: all that is left to do, as readers, is to 
unfurl the meaning inherent in its original articulation; we are beholden to a 
source, origin, or arché of plasticity. Hegel’s provision of the essential or substantial 
form of plasticity acts as a grid of intelligibility, functioning as a kind of Kantian 
understanding: it determinatively regulates the possibilities of how we understand 
plasticity. This, however, contravenes Malabou’s understanding of plasticity in 
two principal respects. First, this would mean that plasticity lacks exactly the 
future that Malabou’s elaboration of plasticity is supposed to demonstrate: if the 
possibilities of this concept are guaranteed in advance, this confirms precisely the 
traditional image of Hegel that Malabou intends to undermine. A preformationist 
Hegel is exactly the Hegel of received tradition Malabou seeks to modify through 
the very notion of plasticity. The second connected point is that this approach 
would entail that the reception of the form of plasticity is decidedly unilateral: 
Malabou acts as a passive vessel or conduit of something already constituted or 
completed. The purely genetic or preformationist reading of ‘plasticity’, where 
Hegel is the proprietary and unique author, means that Malabou adds nothing 
to plasticity itself, thereby flouting the essential character of plasticity as being 
both the reception and giving of form. Moreover, this characterization of plasticity 
as being inaugurated by and through Hegel disavows that Hegel himself was 
influenced or informed by any precedent notions of plasticity, and thus Hegel 
would be represented as a pure origin, authoring plasticity out of nothing. It is 
here where the two approaches—spontaneous generation and 
preformationism—come full circle to reveal their speculative identity and shared 
implication, a fact that Malabou highlights with help from Kant. Malabou 
adduces Kant’s insight that, despite appearances to the contrary, advocates of 
both spontaneous generation and preformationism commonly eschew the 
formative power and life of individual form, that is, its historical becoming, 
 
31 Ibid. 26.  
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sharing the fundamental position that form ultimately derives from the “‘hand of 
the creator,’” that the “‘supreme intelligent world-cause’” forms a “‘fruit with his 
own hand and [leaves] the mother only its development and nourishment.’”32 This 
is to say, form does not become but emerges or is created directly by the 
intervention or authority of a creator. In the first sense, plasticity is spontaneously 
generated by Hegel or by the occasionalist interpretive intervention of Malabou; 
in the second, plasticity is a product born directly by the hand of its creator, 
Hegel: predetermined, preestablished, preformed. We, as readers, simply inherit 
a treasure discovered by Malabou and preserved for philosophical posterity. 
Measured against the indices of Malabou’s own thought, then, the extant account 
of plasticity’s own generation does not meet the requisite epigenetic standard 
stipulated of genuine biological and philosophical form. If plasticity obtains its 
substantial form in Hegel, should there not be an account of plasticity’s own 
conceptual becoming, its epigenesis? If Malabou insists on epigenesis as a 
paradigm for multiple modes of generation—biological, philosophical, and 
otherwise—should her own concept of plasticity not be subjected to or 
demonstrated to have emerged through the same regime or process of 
development?  
* 
The provision of Goethe as a forebearer, the admittance of a history before 
Hegel, corroborates a curious presentiment experienced when confronting 
plasticity: the strange fulsomeness and profundity of this concept without 
antecedent, without precedent, without history, appearing almost as a kind of 
conceptual driftwood fortuitously discovered washed ashore in Hegel. If 
Malabou’s argument is to be internally consistent, there must be an epigenesis of 
plasticity: there must be some accounting for how plasticity becomes, otherwise it 
remains like the very subject of presence Malabou abjures, a concept 
“announcing itself in the naïve movement of a birth without history.”33 To rely on 
one of Malabou’s privileged metaphors, if the life of form processually emerges in 
the way that a sculpture is progressively formed or shaped, then what of the 
distinctive contours or ‘accidents’ that contribute to plasticity’s ‘substantial’ form 
 
32 Kant qtd in Malabou, Before Tomorrow, 162.  
33 Malabou, Plasticity at Dusk, 9.  
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or shape as conferred on it in Hegel. In a fortuitous turn of phrase that connects 
the two registers of language operative here, between substance, essence, accident 
and epigenesis, “epigenesis,” Malabou attests, “cannot be thought without its 
accidents...”34 Substance or essence does not emerge out of nowhere but is rather, 
as Malabou argues, constituted by a history of accidents that confer upon it its 
singular expression, shape, or form. If substance is the history, the singular 
expression, of its accidents—the becoming essential or substantial of the 
accident—then what of the history of the epigenetic becoming substantive of 
plasticity?  
* 
In her various accounts of plasticity, Malabou has always acknowledged its Greek 
origin, highlighting that its modern emergence derives from the originary Greek 
plassein which means “‘to model,’ to ‘mould.’”35 The adjective, plastic, then 
furnishes two simultaneous meanings: “on the one hand” plastic means to be 
‘susceptible to changes of form’ or malleable…and on the other hand, ‘having 
the power to bestow form, the power to mould.’”36 To nominate or characterize 
something as plastic is to say at once that it is passive and formable—like one 
would say of clay—and that it is also active and formative, as one would convey 
in expressions like plastic surgeon and plastic artist: the plastic surgeon and plastic 
artist are individuals who give or bestow form, having the power to shape and 
mold.37 Plasticity is the capacity to fashion and to be fashioned. However, Malabou’s 
 
34 Malabou, Before Tomorrow, 30.  
35 Malabou, Future of Hegel, 8.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. The speculative or double nature of plasticity as a concept should be remembered here in the 
examples of both the plastic surgeon and plastic artist: while the plastic surgeon and plastic artist are active 
and formative—in that they are understood to give shape or form, to have a capacity to produce form—
they nonetheless do not do so frictionlessly as the materials they work on are also plastic and thereby do not 
placidly yield; both the materials and instruments of the surgeon and artist offer their own forms of 
resistance: they do not simply accede and receive the form of the ostensibly ‘active’ surgeon and artist, but 
impart form by requiring work, negotiation, and improvisation. As a plastic artist, say, as a sculptor, one 
works with clay or marble and responds to the particular character of the material: whether it is soft, hard, 
recalcitrant or pliable; is it being agreeable—suitably placid—or is it being difficult and resistant? As an 
artisan, say a baker, one has to work and knead dough, responding to how it acts: the supposed docile 
material becomes an agent, forming and imparting shape to the artisan. A critical component of any plastic 
enterprise is learning and learning to work with the singularity of one’s materials—in this sense, the putative 
‘materials,’ typically rendered as passive, should be seen as a co-agent in the production of form. 
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recognition is primarily etymological and she quickly returns to Hegel’s specific 
discussion of ‘plastic’ in his own oeuvre.38 So, even though Malabou announces 
that plasticity “…has a long philosophical past, which has itself remained too 
long in the shadows,”39 she somewhat strangely leaves this shadow draped across 
millennia. Between ancient Greece and Hegel, apparently, there is nothing 
substantial to consider: a historical void with nothing of essential interest. The 
immediate impression that there is nothing essential or substantial from Greece 
to Hegel inadvertently but nonetheless objectionably rehearses some of the worst 
accusations against Western, European philosophy (an appearance which is 
particularly acute and unfortunate given the relevance of both Hegel and 
Heidegger to Malabou’s thinking).  The “birth place” 40 of plasticity is Hegelian 
philosophy, effected through some kind of immaculate conception, having no 
origin but a distant Greek homeland.  
Yet, other scholars have taken more of a historical interest in the idea of 
‘plastic’ and ‘plasticity.’ The fact of the matter is that ‘plastic’ has a long 
philosophical history. Scholars agree with Malabou that plasticity can be traced 
back to Greek antiquity, with some attesting to its specific presence in thinkers 
such as Aristotle.41 However, most accounts seem to agree that the first 
determinate and meaningfully conceptual use is in the work of ancient Greek 
physician Galen (126-216) and his development of the idea of dunamis diaplastike.42 
Deployed in the context of Galen’s discussion of embryological theories of 
 
38 Ibid., 9-10.  
39 Malabou, What Should We Do, 13.  
40 Malabou, Plasticity at Dusk, 27.  
41 See Maurizio Meloni, Impressionable Biologies: From the Archaeology of Plasticity to the Sociology of Epigenetics (New 
York: Routledge, 2019), 6. Meloni’s examples from Aristotle are simply adjectival and, admittedly, 
somewhat uncompelling. For example, Meloni quotes from the Aristotle’s Meteorology where Aristotle writes: 
“Those impressibles that retain the shape impressed on them and are easily moulded by the hand are called 
‘plastic’; those that are not easily moulded, such as stone or wood, or are easily moulded but do not retain 
the shape impressed, like wool or a sponge, are not plastic” (6).  The mere presence or use of an adjective 
does not indicate a conscious or meaningful philosophical investment in the concept itself as an organizing 
or substantial notion on the level of ‘plasticity’ itself. 
42 Hiro Hirai, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy: Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life and the Soul (Boston: 
Brill, 2011), 19; William B. Hunter “The Seventeenth Century Doctrine of Plastic Nature,” The Harvard 
Theological Review 43, No. 3 (Jul., 1950): 197-213; Diana Stanciu, “The Sleeping Musician: Aristotle’s 
Vegetative Soul and Ralph Cudworth’s Plastic Nature,” Blood, Sweat and Tears: The Changing Concepts of 
Physiology from Antiquity to the Present (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 713-751, see 732 specifically.  
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generation, the neologism dunamis diaplastike has its root in the notions of ‘to mold’ 
(diaplattein) and ‘molding’ (diaplasis) and is translated variously by different 
commentators to mean molding or formative (diaplastike) faculty or power 
(dunamis)43 as well as constructive power.44 Writing in On the Natural Faculties, Galen 
describes this “special alternative faculty of Nature” as a “shaping [diaplasen] or 
formative [diaplastiken] faculty [dunamis]” that he repeatedly characterizes 
throughout his work as “artistic.”45 Combining this notion of ‘to mold’ or 
‘molding’ with dunamis—variously rendered as faculty, power, or capacity—
Galen creates this expression to provide an explanation of the generation and 
formation of living beings and to capture what he believed to be the artistic power 
of nature operating through living organisms.46  
From Galen, dunamis diaplastike then moves through the work of Persian 
physician Avicenna (980-1037) and then Averroes (1126-98), who translate it as 
‘formative power’ (virtus formativa) or ‘informative power’ (virtus informativa),47 with 
Avicenna specifically referring to a “plastic faculty (lit. as in making a sculpture 
or a painting).”48 From the Latin-Arabic world, the concept enters into Medieval 
Scholasticism through the work of German friar and philosopher Albert the 
Great (1193-1280) and sees widespread use in scholastic discussion of theories of 
natural generation.  
After Albert the Great, ‘formative power’ emerges in the work of two Italian 
Renaissance thinkers—Nicolas Leoniceno (1428-1524) and Marsilio Ficino (1433-
 
43 Hirai, Medical Humanism, 19.  
44 George Boys-Stones and Simon Swain, Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon’s Physiognomy from Classical 
Antiquity to Medieval Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 100.  
45 Galen, On the Natural Faculties (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), 19, 25.  
46 Specifically, Galen originally invokes this principle in mounting an argument against Aristotle’s theory 
of embryology. Justin E.H. Smith, The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7. For Aristotle, the male is the active force or ‘form’ that shapes the 
passive female ‘matter’. Against this, Galen proposes that both the male and female contribute a formal or 
formative principle, thereby both giving shape or form to the product or offspring.46 In this way, dunamis 
diaplastike is intended to demarcate a power or capacity (dunamis) to shape across or between (dia-plastike), 
that is, as a plastic ability to give and receive form.  
47 Hirai, Medical Humanism, 19-20 
48 See Avicenna, The Canon of Medicine of Avicenna (AMS Press: New York, 1973), 112-114. 
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1499)—as well as touches the thought of Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494).49 
Leoniceno’s On Formative Power (1506) is the first to introduce Galen’s work in the 
“context of Renaissance humanism” and Ficino takes up the ‘formative power’ in 
his interpretation of Plotinus and the notion of anima mundi or world soul.50 
Leoniceno and Ficino then influence the transmission of ‘formative power’ to 
France in the thought of Jean Fernel’s idea of formative or shaping power (vis 
conformans or vis conformatrix) (1497-1558).51 From Fernel’s work in France, ‘plastic 
faculty’ is deployed by Julius Ceaser Scaliger (1540-1609) before moving through 
German polymath Jacob Schegk (1511-1587) as the vis plastica or ‘plastic force’, 
influencing thinkers such as Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) and William Harvey 
(1578-1678). Lastly, all roads in this journey of dunamis diaplastike tend to lead to 
one conduit for this concept’s life in the modern imaginary: there is universal 
consensus that the notion enters the modern imaginary in a new, conscious 
philosophical articulation in the work of Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth’s 
(1617-1688) concept of plastic nature. With minor differences and emphases, this 
genealogy essentially comprises the skeletal map outlined out by scholars about 
the history of ‘plastic’ leading into the seventeenth century and modern Western, 
European philosophy.52  
* 
The extensive documentation of ‘plastic’ in the history of philosophical 
thought evinces sufficient material to merit subjecting the implicit, 
unacknowledged premise of Malabou’s account of plasticity—there is nothing 
essential or substantial that transpires from Greece to eighteenth-century 
Germany (Hegel)—to critical scrutiny and invites the question of how one is to 
respond to this capacious conceptual past. One approach offered by Maurizio 
Meloni’s Impressionable Biologies: From the Archaeology of  Plasticity to the Sociology of  
 
49 Tobias Rees, Plastic Reason: An Anthropology of Brain Science in Embryogenic Terms (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2016), 227.  
50 Hirai, Medical Humanism, 94.  
51 Kuni Sakamoto, Julius Caeser Scaliger, Renaissance Reformer of Aristotelianism: A Study of His Exotericae 
Exercitationes (Boston: Brill Publishing 2016), 113.  
52 Hunter, “Plastic Nature”; Hirai, Medical Humanism; Smith, Animal Generation; Augustín Ostachuk “The 
Evolution Concept: The Concept Evolution,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 
14, no. 3 (2018): 340.  
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Epigenetics (2019)—the first monograph dedicated to a historical archaeology of 
plasticity—is to claim that plasticity has always been with us. In his assessment of 
critical accounts of plasticity, Meloni singles out Malabou for praise, writing that 
while most commentators “avoid…historical depth and genealogical awareness,” 
Malabou notably represents an exception.53 Meloni identifies Malabou as 
“unique” amongst modern scholars for tracing plasticity back to “its original 
Greek moment.”54 However, Meloni laments that “Malabou’s reading” of 
plasticity ultimately “reflects an idealized view of plasticity that remains 
unsatisfactory from a genealogical point of view,” contending that his proposed 
historical and sociological longe durée perspective is a necessary “corrective to 
idealized philosophical readings” such as Malabou’s.55 Meloni argues that 
accounts like Malabou’s are deficient because they are insufficiently historical and 
presentist: plasticity is treated as new when it is not. Against historically amnesic 
treatments of plasticity, Meloni proposes “a longer genealogical perspective to 
suggest a more complicated state of affairs” about plasticity.56 If, Meloni states, 
“plasticity means an ongoing interaction with the surrounding 
environment…plasticity seems the standard, not the revolutionary, view in a 
global history of body-world configurations.”57  
To adduce one representative line of argumentation, Meloni mounts his 
argument for the global historical existence of plasticity by citing the traditional 
role of the environment as a decisive ‘moulding’ factor in ancient discourses: 
geography and climate were seen as critical agents in shaping or forming the 
particular character of different peoples and nations. Meloni refers to the way 
that particular discursive constructions of different populations depended on the 
notion of the malleability and permeability of the body with respect to various 
factors such as environment and geography. For example, some people and 
cultures are referred to as ‘soft’ or ‘temperate’ or, conversely, ‘hot’ or ‘warlike.’58 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.   
55 Ibid.   
56 Meloni, Impressionable Biologies, x.  
57 Ibid.   
58 Ibid., 21 
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Meloni refers to this “plasticity of traits” to show that we have long depended on 
the idea of plasticity—that bodies have always been adaptable and porous given 
that many ancient thinkers testified to the fact that environment, climate, and 
geography shape people differently. The fact that we historically recognized “the 
moulding influence of geography” and “the plastic power of places” burnishes 
proof, Meloni attests, of an ancient understanding of plasticity.59 Accordingly, 
Meloni affirms and seeks to elaborate the myriad and multiple plastic 
“impressionable biologies,” of the “original non-modern intuition of a body 
constantly exposed to an immense number of external influences” that has been 
variously and complexly articulated from antiquity to the present.60  
Meloni’s putatively corrective approach of asserting a long, historical 
existence of plasticity, however, exhibits decisive faults. First, Meloni’s choice 
example reveals a misunderstanding of the double nature of plasticity as the 
giving and receiving of form. While it is certainly true that the historical formative 
or shaping power of climate and geography reveals a certain ‘porosity of bodies’ 
or the ability for human beings to be differentially formed, appeals to the plastic 
power of the environment refer simply to the ability to receive form. The fact that 
the climate or environment was invoked to say that people are formed to be 
essentially, say, weak, soft, or lethargic is not evidence of plasticity, but of a simple, 
crude determinism. The relationship of formation implicit here is decisively 
unilateral, describing the furnishing of an essence of which the subject being 
formed is allowed no latitude or escape. To think plasticity proper would be to 
say that while people are formed by their climate, there is no putative essence of 
a people or character to speak of in terms of fundamentally being one way or 
another: one’s climate or environment is not fate. Such is, patently, the antonym 
of plasticity. Second, by asserting a transhistorical existence of plasticity—
plasticity has always conceptually existed—Meloni effectively de-historicizes 
plasticity, critically ignoring or abjuring in particular Malabou’s cardinal 
emphasis on both the qualitative jump from adjective to substantive, from plastic 
to plasticity. This is made evident in a footnote where Meloni rebuffs Malabou, 
writing: “[h]owever, the usage of adjective ‘plastic’ is documented in all main 
 
59 Ibid., 22.  
60 Ibid., 31.  
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European languages well before what Malabou suggests…[it] already appears in 
English in the first half of the seventeenth century…”61 Malabou is clear with 
respect to her claim that what she is interested in is the emergence of the 
particular substantive form of plasticity not the myriad accidental use of the word 
plastic in the history of thought—she never disputes the adjectival use of plastic 
(she in fact depends on it for the construction of her argument). It is not that the 
adjectival form is unrelated or unimportant—it is both—but that there is 
something philosophically significant about the development of a substantive that 
transforms a term of “indeterminate use” into one of invested and determinate 
“conceptual value.”62 In the attempt to read a long durée history of plasticity, 
Meloni strips it of the very definition that Malabou seeks to bestow.  
 
* 
Plasticity is ancient and everywhere. Plasticity is born in Hegel. Whereas the 
latter foregoes an epigenesis of its form and occults the process of becoming or 
formation, the former tends toward an indiscriminate account where plasticity 
diffuses amongst an almost atomistic history. Lost amidst a plenum of fragmented 
points that are here, there, and, everywhere, plasticity thus loses its particular 
form and the critical definition which confers upon it its philosophical power and 
purchase, failing to meaningfully account for how these isolated iterations 
conspire to provide a determinate form and, as Malabou attests, become-
substantive in Hegel. Plasticity never arrives but was always there. For one, a 
history so capacious it loses definition and, for the other, hardly a history at all: a 
missing history, a mysterious conception. How, then, between the two do we 
mark out a path?  
The first point of agreement is that, conceptually, and etymologically, 
plasticity has its embryological echo in Greek thought. Second, that from this 
initial inception, the idea of plastic enjoys a rich and complex history, 
peregrinating across both centuries and continents in a variety of forms. The 
original remit of this concept, through its various permutations, iterations, or 
 
61 Meloni, Impressionable Biologies, 33, fn. 4.  
62 Catherine Malabou, “Plasticity,” Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (ed.) Barbara Cassin, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 786. 
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guises, is the realm of embryology or generation, answering the query of how 
particular biological or natural forms form themselves. The conundrum that each 
modulated iteration of dunamis diaplastike seeks to relieve is the issue of how life 
forms itself: how does something that obviously has a power to shape life but that 
lacks intelligence or consciousness conceivably execute or accomplish the level of 
complexity on display in the construction of organic bodies.63 This archaeology 
is extrapolated from scholarship with the specific, regional focus of the history of 
theories of embryology and generation—specifically fetal formation. While 
potentially interesting in a long durée approach to plasticity, the impact that these 
ideas would have in their particular instantiations on the intellectual milieu and 
imaginary of eighteenth-century German thought in which Malabou claims that 
plasticity becomes-substantive seems somewhat remote to plausibly endorse. The 
capacious conceptual past of plastic is too expansive, distracting from the task of 
explaining with requisite economy how plasticity arrives in Goethe and then 
Hegel. If plasticity becomes-substantive in Hegel through the appropriation of 
this concept from Goethe, instead of attempting to catalogue and offer a 
totalizing world history of plasticity, one’s focus might rightly tighten on 
furnishing a particularized history to offer the most plausible account of the basis 
of plastic and plasticity in the eighteenth-century German imaginary. Epigenesis 
implies a particular history of a form (biological or philosophical)—to understand 
plasticity as it becomes a conceptual substantive, we need to hone in on the 
specific history or geneaology of its emergence. So, while the history of ‘plastic’ 
is certainly part of its emergence—representing dormant, latent, or virtual traits 
that can be variably expressed through the concept’s actualization—we should 
attend to the more local development of the form itself.  
If the first point of unanimity about the concept of plasticity is its Greek origin, 
the second is the consensus amongst scholars that that the various instantiations 
of ‘plastic’ gather and experience a significant, critical consistency, and new 
conscious theoretical articulation in the middle of the seventeenth century in 
Britain in the work of Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth’s concept of plastic 
nature. It is here that these ‘accidental’ instances of plastic first crystallize, 
formalizing into something uniquely and philosophically substantial. How, then, 
 
63 Sakamoto, Scaliger, 111-12.  
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from the marginalia of seventeenth century British philosophy to late eighteenth 
century Germany: how do we get from Cudworth to Hegel? Plotting this map 
would begin to provide the answer to how plasticity becomes-substantive in 
Hegel.  
The outline of a such a map can only be briefly gestured to here. Any possible 
connections between Cudworth and Hegel are not at first immediately clear. 
Again, this is due to the fact of Cudworth’s largely marginal, if not completely 
neglected, role in the development of modern, European philosophy. However, 
it is Malabou’s tipping of the hand towards Goethe’s invention of the concept of 
plasticity and Hegel’s appropriation of it that opens the possibility of tracing a 
clear path from Cudworth to plasticity. From Cudworth to Goethe we can trace 
or mark out a plausible path. Cudworth develops the notion of ‘plastic nature’ in 
the late seventeenth century as a conceptual way to mediate between what he 
considers to be two equally objectionable positions: it is equally implausible, 
according to Cudworth, to maintain that “all things are produced Fortuitously, 
or by the Unguided mechanism of Matter” or that “God himself…do all things 
Immediately and Miraculously.”64 The former position—materialism— is 
insufficient and improper because it absents God from the world, whereas the 
latter—theological voluntarism—suffers the opposite conundrum: God is too 
present in the formation and operation of the world. While one cannot say God is 
nowhere and responsible for nothing, one also cannot say that God is everywhere 
and responsible for everything. To escape the impasse between the untenable 
positions of a world shaped entirely by matter or God, Cudworth proposes the 
concept of “Plastick Nature.”65 Plastic nature is a more-than-material but less-than-
divine formative agent that acts as “an Inferior and Subordinate Instrument of 
God,” relieving God from doing everything “Immediately” but still guaranteeing 
that the formation of the world is still “Disposed and Ordered by the Deity.”66 
Plastic nature thus moves beyond either strict passivity or activity: it receives 
form—it follows God’s designs—but gives form as well, as it is the plastic force 
 
64 Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe: Wherein All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is 
Confuted and Its Impossibility Demonstrated, (London: Richard Royston, 1678), 147.  
65 Ibid., 150.  
66 Ibid.  
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implementing these designs. Cudworth’s conceptual invention is then adopted by 
Shaftesbury in the early eighteenth century. Cudworth’s imagining of a plastic 
nature—a nature that shapes or forms itself as a kind of unconscious artist in 
service of God—made a strong impression on Shaftesbury, influencing 
Shaftesbury’s ideas about aesthetics and nature. Shaftesbury extends and deepens 
Cudworth’s initial idea, exhorting each of his readers to become a “moral artist” 
who is a “second Maker, a just Prometheus under Jove,” shaping or forming 
themselves like “that sovereign artist or universal plastic nature.”67 Through the 
notion of this plastic nature, Shaftesbury re-imagines both the individual and 
nature as self-forming artists, constantly in a process of transformation and 
creation. Shaftesbury’s vision of the individual and nature as creative or plastic 
artists—as genius, Promethean-like formative agents—then migrates to 
Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century, capturing the imagination of 
Herder, who calls Shaftesbury “the beloved Plato of Europe,”68 and, finally, 
Goethe. As Ernst Cassirer explains, “[i]n the development of German thought 
Shaftesbury's apostrophes to nature exert a decisive influence; they give 
expression to those fundamental forces which shaped the philosophy of nature of 
Herder and the young Goethe.”69 Through Herder, Goethe embarks on a study 
of Shaftesbury in the early 1770s, and his view of nature is transformed, becoming 
“…less naive” and inflected with “more esthetic and pantheistic implications.”70 
The hidden fundament of Goethe’s pantheistic conception of nature, of Nature 
as a dynamic, pervasive, formative and self-forming force, as Plastizität, is 
Shaftesbury’s, and implicitly, Cudworth’s, conception of nature as plastic. More 
fulsomely tracing out the development of plastic nature from Cudworth, to 
Shaftesbury, and then to Goethe may promise to fulfill the requisite conceptual 
 
67 Shaftesbury, “Soliloquy: Or, Advice to an Author,” Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (ed.) 
Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 93. 
68 See Stanley Grean , Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study in Enthusiasm (Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 1967), ix-x. 
69 Ersnt Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (trans.) Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 84-5. See also Wilhelm Dilthey, “Berlin Plan,” Introduction to 
the Human Sciences (eds.) Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
489. 
70 Mark O Kistler, "The Sources of the Goethe-Tobler Fragment ‘Die Natur’," Monatshefte 46, no. 7 (1954): 
383-89, here 388.  
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epigenesis of the becoming substantive of plasticity in Hegel currently absent in 
Malabou.  
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